Principles Of War - "Strategy for Group and Individual Evangelism" continued.....

IX. Economy of Force

"The more the concentration can be compressed into one act and one moment, the more perfect are its results."--Clausewitz

Economy of Force is efficiency in fighting, effectiveness in warfare. If our objective is the annihilation of the enemy army we will take the offensive at the decisive point. In order to do this effectively, the combined application of all principles of war is necessary. A statement by General Erfurth mentions or implies most of the principles of war:

"To concentrate overwhelmingly superior members at the decisive points is impossible without strategic surprise. The assembly of the shock-group must be done as quickly as possible in such a way that all units can attack at one and the same time."

Each of the following principles when supplied separately economizes force. When they are supplied in unison economy of force is achieved. Let us look at each principle in the light of economy of force, realizing that all of them are interdependent:

1. Objective: The greatest incentive for economizing is to know where you are going and then go there.
2. Offensive: "Going" economizes forces. It takes less force to mount an offense against one point than to defend all points.
3. Security: If the enemy does not know what we are going to do, we can do it with less force. If he knows, he will then be prepared and we may not be able to do it all even with a much greater force.
4. Surprise: This principle certainly allows a commander to do the job with less force.
5. Mobility: Mobility economizes force by increasing, in effect, the numbers of men and arms. "A leader who aims at mobility should not be afraid to strain his troops to the limit in order that they may reach the battlefield in time. Many victories were made possible by forced marches. Mobility equals increase in numbers." (Erfurth).
6. Cooperation: When allied forces advance with a common objective and in unity, they can attain victory with fewer men than if they had acted independently.
7. Concentration: This may seem to be, but is not, the opposite of economy of force. To use one's force in driblets here and there may only result in consistent defeat. But if we concentrate at the decisive points, we are using economy of force.

(There is such a thing as overconcentration in a places which are not decisive points. "Consequently, the fronts where no decisions are being sought should be manned with a minimum of force" (Erfurth). To concentrate at undecisive points violates economy of force. It is better to have one's force scattered in driblets at decisive points than have it concentrated at an undecisive point.)

As we apply the various aspects of the principles of economy of force to the spiritual war in which we are engaged, we can say that any concentration of Christians where there are few or no non-Christians is an overconcentration of Christians at a point which is not decisive. To have concentration of Christians where paganism is thick and rampant is compatible with the principles of war.

Because Christians have a tendency to concentrate at undecisive points, it may be difficult to get more than a few away from places of mislocated concentration to points where decisive battles are being fought. The few may not be enough for effective concentration, but their proper deployment is a step in the right direction, a step toward economy of force. Not to send a few to those decisive points would violate several principles of war. Economy of force uses what is available to do the job. [Think about this when a work-party is assigned to go help a needy non-Christian. Concentration of force by having many show up is giving this person witness of the demonstrated gospel of Christ, without which the spoken gospel of Christ becomes hobbled.]

When there are many decisive points and the Christians are congregated away from the front, we ought to plead with God for economy of force: "And I sought for a man among them, who should build up the wall and stand in the breach before me for the land, that I should not destroy it, but I found none" (Ezekiel 22:30).

Concentration in a noncombatant area is legitimate for training, to receive power or to prepare to attack. If concentration remains after training has been accomplished or if we dilly dally around in the rear, we will never be ready for war. This is a waste of force!

The Lord Jesus Christ said to His disciples, "Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer and on the third day rise from the dead, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be preached in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things. And behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you; but stay in the city until you are clothed with power from on high" (Luke 24:46-49). The primary objective was "all nations." Jerusalem was the place where power was to be received and from which to start after the early believers had received the power. However, they stayed in Jerusalem a prolonged period of time after they had received power through the coming of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Their failure to move out was disobedience to orders. But God finally forced them to leave by allowing persecution. Concentration in the wrong place is not economy of force.

When these principles are combined with an offensive at a decisive point, we are practicing economy of force.

In Biblical history the greatest example of these principles combined in one military battle is Gideon's victory over the armies of Midian and Amalek described in Judges 7 and 8. In his God-directed use of economy of force, Gideon sent 31,700 men home and won the battle with 300 men.

The much needed application of this principle is that we must send to the decisive point men who are willing and ready to go. It may be that, as it was with Gideon, 22,000 are afraid to go and another 9,700 are not ready to go. Thus, perhaps only 300 men are willing and ready to go with the message of Jesus Christ.

It was not God's plans to invite the Midianites and the Amalekites one and two at a time to the Israelites' home towns where 31,700 soldiers could take them captive. Nor is it His plan to invite non-Christians one and two at a time into an overconcentration of Christians at an undecisive point where the believers preach the Gospel at each other [although Calvary Chapel does this quite effectively, by using other keys of local church evangelism right within their church services. More on this later.] It is God's plan to attack the decisive points with victory in mind. There are so many places and so few willing to go that we must economize our force.

Jesus said, "The harvest is plentiful but the laborers are few; pray therefore the Lord of the harvest to send out laborers into his harvest" (Luke 10:2).

This is in the imperative. Jesus Christ tells us to pray that God would send men. He commands us to do it and tells us why. The harvest is too much for the few reapers. Let us pray for economy of force.

X. Pursuit

"Only pursuit of the beaten enemy gives the fruits of victory."--Clausewitz

In his biography of Field Marshall Viscount Allenby of Migiddo and Felixstowe, General Archibald Wavell, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., gives a very clear picture of the problems of pursuit:

"To the uninitiated, pursuit seems the easiest possible form of war. To chase a flying, presumably demoralized enemy must be a simple matter, promising much gain at the expense of some exertion and hardship, but little danger. Yet the successful or sustained pursuits of history have been few, the escapes from a lost battle many. The reasons are partly material, but mainly moral. A force retreating falls back on its depots and reinforcements, unless it is overrun, it is growing stronger all the time, and there are many expedients besides fighting by which it can gain time: bridges or roads blown up, defiles blocked, supplies destroyed. The pursuer soon out runs his normal resources. He may possibly be able to feed himself at the expense of his enemies or of the countryside; he is not likely to replenish his ammunition and warlike equipment in the same way. But the chief obstacle he has to overcome is psychological. The pursued has a greater incentive to haste than the pursuer, and, unless he is demoralized, a stronger urge to fight. It is only natural that the soldier who has risked his life and spent his toil in winning a battle should desire relaxation in safety as his mead of victory, and that the general and staff should feel a reaction from strain. So that while coolness in disaster is the supreme proof of a Commander's courage, energy in pursuit is the surest test of his strength of will. Few have carried out pursuits with such relentless determination as Allenby in 1917 and 1918."

The spiritual war for men is not much different. If the principles of war were applied by a body of believers in any given locality, I believe there would be a great spiritual victory. The battle would be won and there would be many spiritual conversions to Jesus Christ.

However, when a breakthrough for Christ is achieved, we relax, as though the fight were over.

Consider Gideon's rout of the Midianites. In Judges 7 we find that for the battle 300 men were all that were needed to make the breakthrough. But once the battle was won and the Midianites were fleeing, Gideon called for the men he had previously sent home; three of the four tribes joined in the pursuit. He also called out the tribe of Ephraim to cut off the fleeing Midianites by seizing the fords of the Jordan. "And Gideon came to the Jordan and passed over, he and the three hundred men who were with him, faint yet pursuing."

The fact that 120,000 of the enemy were already slain, that Gideon had won the battle, and that he and his men were tired and hungry, did not stop his pursuit. By this time only fifteen thousand of the enemy remained. "And Gideon went up by the caravan route east of Nobah and Jogbehah and attacked the army for the army was off its guard. And Zebah and Zlamunna fled, and he pursued them and took the two kings of Midian, Zebah and Zalmunna and he threw all of the army into a panic. Then Gideon...returned from the battle..."

In physical warfare, the fruits of victory are conserved by pursuing the beaten enemy. The victors cannot relax or just "follow up" the prisoners of war. The pursuit will bring many more prisoners in a short time, but if it is delayed, another major battle will ensue. The defeated enemy will have time to regroup his forces.

In spiritual warfare we must think beyond the converts made in the immediate battle. We must pursue the many non-Christians who are "fleeing" in conviction of sin, but who as yet have not surrendered to Jesus Christ. In other words, we as Christians ought to consider the principle of pursuit to be as important as "follow up" of the new Christians after a spiritual breakthrough. The victory has prepared many men almost to receive Jesus Christ.

Although it is very important to take care of prisoners of war, it takes a minimum of men to take care of disarmed prisoners. In the spiritual war the prisoners are the converts to Jesus Christ. They are not only disarmed, they are now on our side. It should take fewer people to follow through on the new converts than is needed to pursue the great numbers who have been defeated but who have not yet surrendered to Jesus Christ. Sometimes after a major spiritual victory, even "follow up" is not attempted. Still worse is the failure to press the pursuit of those who are running away from Jesus Christ.

The most effective way to pursue the beaten enemy in physical war is to hit from his unprotected flanks. If a direct pursuit is carried out, the victors run into the deadly sting of the rear guard [and Rommel was a master at putting together deadly rear-guard's, composed of mobile 88mm anti-tank batteries. The British learned to not follow too close behind Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps!] and into many roadblocks and blown bridges, and so the retreating enemy gets away. To avoid these, the victors should travel a parallel path, outrun and intercept the retreating enemy. To continue direct pursuit after the battle is won is to lose the retreating enemy. In order to effect an interception in the pursuit, mobility is needed. If immediate pursuit is undertaken, as many more captives as were taken in the battle can be secured.

Prior to the Megiddo battle in September 1918 Allenby promised his cavalry 30,000 prisoners of war. His staff thought he was presumptuous. In reality he ended up with 50,000 prisoners having reduced the Turkish Seventh and Eighth armies to a few columns.

Let us consider the "how" of spiritual pursuit. First, we must be convinced that many people are ready to receive Christ and will receive Him if they are cut off and confronted with their sin and the Saviour. When a man begins to run away, he is ready to be captured. This does not mean that he will not put up a last desperate struggle or will not continue to run. This is why it is important to cut off his retreat.

To outrun fleeing, convicted sinners, God-directed mobility is required. As in Gideon's case, it might take a small, well disciplined, courageous group to make a breakthrough in the spiritual conflict for men. [Like the "work parties" that went down into the "salt mines" of Brooklyn NY with blankets and Bibles for the homeless--they created the "breakthrough"--] Once the breakthrough has been made and many have received Christ, many others will have been convicted of sin, righteousness and judgment and will begin to flee. Then we need more than our hard core of trained men. We need, like Gideon, all of the Christians who were not prepared for the battle but who are necessary in the pursuit. If we depend only on the hard core of Christians who seek to follow hard after Christ, we will win many battles, but there will be no complete rout. There will be successful evangelistic campaigns, but no awakening. If pursuit is practiced, every successful evangelistic campaign is a possible prelude to a general awakening.

If we study spiritual awakenings from Pentecost to the Welsh Revival of 1901 and the Korean revival of 1905, we notice the battle and the breakthrough centered around one man or a small group of men. This was only the start. After that many Christians witnessed and testified of saving grace and more people were converted. Christians got right with the Lord and entered the chase. The whole church was in the awakening. Evan Roberts was not responsible for the 70,000 new Christians in Wales; he was only the leader. God's revivals may start with God-picked men. But they continue only if every Christian, weak or strong, joins in the pursuit.

It is the responsibility of the leader not only to make the breakthrough in the battle with his picked men, but also to call in all the reserves for the rout. Our greatest mobility is in the quantity of Christians who can testify of the saving grace of Jesus Christ. Every Christian should testify to everyone he meets.

Another means of mobility in pursuit is literature distribution--booklets, tracts, books and Scripture portions--all of them on the judgment and love of God. The literature may be offered without charge and distributed at meetings, by the mass of Christians or by direct mail. [Or like those in the Brooklyn Tabernacle, on "good works" outreaches into the poor and homeless sections of Brooklyn.] [The Internet is another new technology for distributing this same precious information.]

A third factor essential to effective pursuit is the manner and content of our appeal. In preaching Christ to the people just prior to the breakthrough, it is possible to be somewhat removed from one's audience. But in pursuit we must be clearly identified with the people. Let there be compassion and understanding in our approach.

Furthermore, an ultimatum should be used in our message, citing the judgment of God on unrepentant men. This is the only effective means that will cause a fleeing man to surrender to Christ. Judgment is the reality he cannot escape if he persists in fleeing from Christ and therefore it has great force in causing a fugitive to stop in his flight. Yet our warning should be given in love and joy.

The church in Thessalonica witnessed to their countrymen in the true sense of pursuit. True, they were not established Christians like those of Ephesus. They did not have two years of Bible school with Paul as the teacher. They had heard the Gospel only three Sabbath days. Nevertheless Paul writes to them a few weeks later:

"For from you sounded out the word of the Lord not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but also in every place your faith to godward is spread abroad; so that we need not to speak any thing."

Will we follow their example?

We must if we are to win!